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  1 Participation in the Conservation Reserve Program and its Effects on Farm 
Productivity and Efficiency 
 
Richard N. Boisvert and Hung-Hao Chang 
Introduction 
Since 1985, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has led to the retirement of 
34 million acres of cropland. Under this voluntary program, the USDA contracts with 
farmers and landowners to retire highly erodible and environmentally sensitive cropland 
and pasture from agricultural production. Land in CRP is planted to grasses, trees, or 
other cover, thereby reducing soil erosion and water pollution, and providing other 
environmental benefits. Rental payments average $50/acre; landowners are reimbursed 
for about half the cost of establishing cover.  
Over the past 20 years, the CRP has undergone important changes. Through 
legislative and regulatory initiatives that give added weight in ranking farmers’ bids to 
environmental objectives other than soil erosion and program costs, USDA is now able to 
enroll more environmentally sensitive, but highly productive land. About 50% of current 
CRP contracts will expire by 2007; over 90% will expire by 2010. Some farmers will 
look to re-enroll cropland, while some land may be returned to crop production (Sullivan 
et al., 2004). If changes in CRP are to enhance its contribution to the environment, we 
must understand the factors affecting CRP participation and the productivity and well 
being of farm households participating in CRP.  
This paper identifies those factors that affect both farmers’ decisions to participate 
in the CRP and the level of participation. We also determine the effect of CRP 
participation on farm productivity. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the 
USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). We proceed with a 
  2specification of an agricultural household production model and interpret the first-order 
conditions and comparative statics. We continue with a discussion of the 3-stage 
econometric model. The first stage is a binary probit model for CRP participation. We 
perform statistical tests for the endogeneity of some regressors. In stage two, we estimate 
both a CRP per-acre payment equation and a CRP acreage enrollment equation, 
correcting for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). In stage three, we estimate group 
production functions and decompose the error into random and technical inefficiency 
components using two-stage method of moments (Kopp and Mullahy, 1990 and Huang et 
al., 2002). Technical and scale efficiencies are compared between groups, as are the 
differences in factor productivity. We conclude by highlighting the policy implications. 
Theoretical Framework 
We focus on a simple household production model to derive comparative static 
results. The farm operator is the only decision maker.
1 There are fixed endowments of 
operator time (E ) and farmland ( A). Time is allocated to leisure (l) and farm production 
(L). Total land is allocated between crop production (A) and enrollment in CRP (Ae). The 
household receives income from agricultural sales, CRP per acre payments (Pe), and 
decoupled payments (M). The utility of the farm household depends on the consumption 
(x) and leisure (l), as well as the improvement in environmental quality (e) generated by 
land committed to CRP. We assume that the commodity price, P, is random; η + = P P , 
where P  is the expected price and the random error follows an arbitrary distribution with 





                                                 
1 While the presence of a spouse and children conditions the farmer’s decisions, we abstract from 
complications associated with work on and off the farm by family members.  
  3in land and labor:  ε ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( A L g A L f A L F + = + h (L, A)u, where . Just 
and Pope (1979) note that an input is risk increasing (decreasing) if g’ (.) is positive 
(negative). Production inefficiency is reflected in h (L, A)u; 
) , 0 ( . . ~
2
ε σ ε d i i
) , ( . . ~
2
u u d i i u σ is the random 
noise in a stochastic frontier function.  
Households maximize expected utility subject to income, time and land constraints: 
(1)     )]} ( , , [ {
, , e A l x
A e l x U E Max
e
=
s.t. (2)  M A P A L F P x e e + + + = ) , ( ) ( η ; (3)  e L l L E + + = ; and (4)  A A A e + = . 
We eliminate variables l and x by substituting equations (2) through (4) into equation (1): 
(5) ], ) ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )( {[(
,
M A P u A A L h A A L g A A L f P EU Max e e e e e L Ae
+ + − − − + − + = ε η     
                        )]} ( ], [ e e A e L L E − − . 







) ( ]} ) )( [( {





∂   0 ) ( )]} )( [( { = − − + + = l L L L x U E u h g f P U E ε η  
where Ui is the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to argument i. 
The optimal levels of Ae and L from the simultaneous solution of equations (6) and (7). 
To interpret the first-order conditions, we take the expectations of both equations (6) and 
(7) and derive some comparative static results. We assume that the random disturbances 
                                                 
2 For tractability, we assume UAeL= ULAe= 0 (Fabella, 1989).   
  4( u , ,ε η ) are independent and approximate the utility function with a second-order Taylor 
series expansion (Isik, 2002).
3 Equations (6) and (7) are:    
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Under both price and production risk, and technical inefficiency, the optimal 
levels of land in CRP and labor for agricultural production depend on the expected 
market price and the production technology. Decisions depend on the nature of each 
source of risk, the risk characteristics of the inputs, the variance of each component of 
risk, technical inefficiency, and the expected marginal utility from leisure and the 
environment. To gain insights, we compare the optimal decisions of CRP acre enrollment 
to the situation with no risk or technical inefficiency. For the simpler model, the first-
order condition corresponding to equation (8) is: 









According to equation (8’), the optimal decision is reached when the expected 
value of marginal agricultural production of land is equal to the CRP payment. According 
to equation (8) above, optimal CRP acres would be larger if land is a risk increasing input 
in agricultural production. If land in farming is risk decreasing, the effect of risk aversion 
on CRP may dominate the marginal revenue effect, leading to less land in CRP.   
 Comparative Static Results    
                                                 
3 Our approach is in contrast to the one most commonly found in the literature that embody constant 
absolute risk aversion  (e.g., Love and Buccola, 1991). 
  5We gain further insights into the effects of risk, farm technology, and government 
policy on optimal input use by examining comparative statics with respect to risk 
preferences and decoupled farm payments. For simplicity, we isolate price risk.  
For only price risk, input decisions (equations (8) and (9)) can be simplified as: 
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Land in CRP is determined by the CRP payment, the potential loss in average revenue 
from moving land out of production, the adjustment for price risk, and the utility the farm 
household derives from the contribution of CRP to environmental quality. Land in CRP 
increases with marginal changes in CRP payment, price risk aversion, and the utility of 
environmental quality. Land in CRP falls as the expected price of agricultural output 
increases, ceteris paribus. Similar logic suggests that labor allocated to agricultural 
production will rise with the expected price of agricultural output, but will fall with 
increases in price risk or in the marginal utility of leisure.  
To identify effects of risk preferences, and CRP and decoupled payments 
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− = , the elasticity of absolute risk aversion at expected post-risk 
consumption (Just and Zilberman, 1983), is positive for decreasing absolute risk aversion.     
From equation (12), there are three terms determining land in CRP as Arrow’s 
absolute risk aversion coefficient changes. The first term in {.} can be implicitly regarded 
as the contribution from consumption. This effect is positive since, based on the first-
order Hessian, the term (
2
η φσ f p − ) is positive.
4 The second term in {.} is the 
contribution from the utility of leisure. The effect should be positive given the concave 
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  7nature of the utility function with respect to leisure. The third term in {.} is the 
contribution related to the effect of the environment. To sum up, the change in land in 
CRP as risk preferences change is ambiguous. However, more risk averse farm 
households likely enroll more land into CRP and use less labor in farming if the marginal 
utilities of leisure and the environment are constant or decline gradually. Similar 
arguments help understand the change in farm labor due to a change in risk preferences. 
From equations (14) and (15) changes in CRP acreage and farm labor to changes 
in the CRP per acre payment also depend on the sizes of the terms related to risk 
preferences, and marginal utilities of consumption, leisure, and the environment. From 
equation (14), land in CRP may or may not increase with CRP payment. Under CARA 
(λ =0), it is easy to see that land in CRP does increase with the CRP payment.    
  Equations (16) and (17) are the comparative static results for changes in CRP land 
and farm labor due to a change in decoupled payments. The effects depend on (λ ), and 
under CARA, λ =0, changing decoupled payments has no effect CRP land and farm 
labor.  
Econometric Framework 
The econometric specification consists of three stages: 1) the CRP participation 
equation; 2) per acre CRP payment and acreage equations; and 3) estimates of differences 
in technical efficiency and productivity between CRP participants and non-participants.  
CRP Participation Decision  
The CRP participation decision depends on the net benefit between (risk adjusted) 
reservation per acre return if the farmer leaves land in production and the potential 
government payment for enrolling land in the CRP. These equations are:    
  8(18)  and   r r r
r e X A P + =
(19)  ,  g g g
g e X A P + =
where P
r and P
g represents the reservation per acre return, and the government per acre 
payment for CRP. The vectors Xr and Xg contain the exogenous variables that are 
assumed to determine the two separate equations; er and eg are random disturbance terms. 
If the farmer participates in CRP, we assume the net benefit is positive. The unobservable 
latent choice variable (I*) for the participation decision is:  
(20) ;I=1 iff  I*> 0 ; I=0  iff  I* < 0.   e X H e e X H X H P P I r g r r g g
r g + = − + − = − = ' ) ( ' ' *
The probability of participation can be specified as: 
(21)  ) ' ( 1 ) ' Pr( ) 1 Pr( X H F X H e I − − = − > = = . 
By assuming F (.) is a normal distribution function, a consistent estimator of H in 
equation (21) is found by Maximum Likelihood as (Maddala, 2001; Greene, 2002): 
(22)   .  ∑
=
Φ − − + Φ =
n
i
X H I X H I L
1
)] ' ( 1 [ * ) 1 ( ) ' ( * log
Per Acre Payment and Acreage Response for CRP 
Reduced forms for of the CRP payment and acreage enrollment equations are:  
(23)   p p p e X P + = ' α  and  
(24)   a a a e X A + = ' α ,    
where Xp and Xa are vectors of independent variables, and  p α  and   a α are parameters. 
The random errors (e, ep,, ea) follow a trivariate normal distribution, 






































  9sample selection correction, OLS provides consistent estimators of ( p a α α , ) in the 
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 is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR).  
Estimating the Production Functions 
We estimate separate production functions for CRP participants and non-
participants, Y1 and Y0.  Depending on the choice, the production function is: 
(27)   1 1 1 1 ' ε β + = X Y  or  0 0 0 0 ' ε β + = X Y  , 
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Since the expected values of the conditional random errors ( ) 
= 0; OLS gives consistent estimators for (
) 0 | ( ), 1 | ( 1 0 = = I e E I e E
ols ols
0 0 1 1 0 1 , , , σ ρ σ ρ β β ).  
Estimating the Technical Efficiency Index 
  10Viewed from a stochastic frontier perspective, we can write: 
(30)     and    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' u v Y X Y
F − + = + = ε β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' u v Y X Y
F − + = + = ε β
where ( ) are group frontier production functions. Following Aigner, et al. (1977), 
v
F F Y Y 0 1 ,
i, ( i = 0,1) are two-sided error terms, N~(0, σvi
2 ); ui‘s are one-sided non-negative 
technical inefficiency components with variances σui
2. The components are assumed 
independent. The expected values of the one-sided error terms are not zero: 
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From equation (31), two conditions must hold: 
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if combined with the information about E (u1), and E (u0). Although the predicted values 
of ( 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ε ε ) can be informed from equation (27), we must specify the distribution of (u1, u0) 
to have the necessary information about (E (u1), E (u0)).  
Once the distributions of u1 and u0 are specified, we estimate ( ) by 
applying the two-stage method of moments (Olson, et al. 1980; Huang et al., 2002), 
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moments of ( 0 1 ˆ , ˆ ε ε ) are equal to these corresponding moments of (v1-u1) and (v0-u0). 
Under the half-normal distribution, the first three moment conditions of u are: 
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  11To solve for the parameters ( ), we must recall the definitions of moments:   
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Given the estimators of ( ), the two error components can be estimated as:  
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The calculation of the technical efficiency index requires point estimates for the 
random variable u for each farmer. Following Jondrow et al. (1982), the expected value 
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The technical efficiency index of each farmer is (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000): 
(38)      
) ˆ | ˆ ( i e u E scf e TE
− =
Estimating Productivity Differences Between Groups 
We cannot directly compare the technical efficiency indices from the estimation 
above because the production environment is assumed to differ by group. The above 
results do provide information on differences in technical efficiency for farms within 
each group. Using this information, we can estimate the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
  12index (Malmquist, 1953) to see the between-group productivity differences
5and identify 
the sources of these differences by decomposing TFP.
6 Although data envelope analysis 
is normally used, TFP can also be defined for stochastic frontiers (Coelli, et al., 1998). 
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where M(.) represents the relative TFP index of group 1 (CRP participants) relative to 
group 0 (non-participants). V and C superscripts refer to the variable returns to scale 
(VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS), respectively. The term TE
kj (yi,xi) represents 
technical efficiency for group j using the level of inputs for group i. Total factor 
productivity is decomposed into three sources. The ratio outside the square brackets 
measures the relative difference in technical efficiency between groups 1 and 0--the 
relative distance between actual production and the frontier function between groups for 
the VRS technology. The first term in brackets measures the ratio of scale efficiencies 
between groups. The second term in brackets measures the relative difference in 
technology--a comparison of the production frontiers between groups.  
The Data 
 
The primary farm household data used in this paper are from the 2001 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), conducted by the National 
                                                 
5 Although the TFP index is usually applied to time series data to measure productivity changes through 
time, this concept can also be applied to the cross section data. (Fare et al., 1994; Thirtle et al., 1995).   
6 To implement this generalized TFP formula, it was necessary to estimate two standard production 
functions (equation 27) for each group. One production function was restricted to be CRS; the other was 
not restricted. For each function, the error was decomposed according to the two-stage method of moments.  
  13Agricultural Statistics Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
We limit our attention to the sample of crop farm households because of our interest in 
examining the effect of CRP participation on farm productivity. The final sample count is 
2,248. About 23% of the sample participated in CRP and or CREP and about 56% of the 
farm operators worked off the farm (Table 1). 
We also rely on some data from additional sources. The economic characteristics 
of local areas, for example, are merged into our ARMS data set. These are county-level 
data from the BEA income and employment files in 2000, the BLS, and the 1990 Census 
of Population. For these characteristics to be pre-determined, the data are lagged one year.  
Three county-level land quality variables are defined as the product of a variable 
reflecting the length of the growing season and the land capability class (Darwin and 
Ingram, 2004). The land capability classes are those used in the Natural Resources 
Conservation Survey (NRCS) and elsewhere to classify land based primarily on physical 
soil characteristics. This index is calculated based on quantifiable factors in the universal 
soil loss equation.
7
Another factor affecting CRP participation is the Environmental Benefits Index 
(EBI) calculated by Farm Service Agency. The EBI score in part determines the 
maximum price that can be paid for land offered into the CRP.
8 It would have been ideal 
to have an EBI index available for each farm household in the ARMS data, but this was 
not the case. As an alternative, we use the EBI data from Jaroszewski, et al. (2000) and 
                                                 
7 We owe special thanks to Roger Claassen for making the data available. The variables are defined as:  
LQH96 = "high" land quality = GS*(LCC1+LCC2); LQM96 = "medium" land quality = 
GS*(LCC3+LCC4); and LQL96 = "low land quality = GS*(LCC5+LCC6+LCC7+LCC8), where LCCi = 
% of land in soil capability class i, and GS = ratio of mean rain-fed season to mean irrigated season. 
8 The components of EBI are: wildlife habitat, water quality benefit, reduction in wind erosion, long-term 
benefit from cover, air quality benefit, conservation propriety areas, and a cost factor.  
  14estimate an EBI for major ERS agricultural regions based on the percentage of land in 
conservation practices currently in CRP. By using the data, we assume that when CRP 
commitments were made, land was likely to be in these land uses in similar proportions.  
Empirical Results 
We distinguish several sets of results: the CRP choice model and the specification 
tests; the estimated CRP payment and acreage equations; and the estimated production 
functions and the related measures of technical efficiency and productivity. Throughout 
the discussion of these results, the effects of variables on CRP participation, CRP 
payments, and CRP acreages are obvious from the signs on particular variables.  
The CRP Participation Equation   
As is seen in Table 2, the likelihood of participation in CRP increases with farm 
size.
9 When compared to cash grain farms, however, the likelihood of participation is 
lower for farms engaged in vegetable, fruit or nursery production. This reflects the high-
value nature of production and higher opportunity cost to those farmers for enrolling land 
in CRP.  
In addition to the negative effect of the opportunity cost of land on participation, 
one could also hypothesize that the likelihood of participation would rise with the level of 
CRP payments. It is impossible to include such a variable in the participation equation 
because of the sample selection problem. Park and Schorr (1997) argued that the 
maximum bid price ought to be one of the factors affecting CRP participation. We have 
no information on actual bids or bids accepted, but we do find that farm households that 
are located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently enrolled are high are more 
                                                 
9 The result differs from the county-level analysis by Kazim and Osborn (1990) who found a negative 
correlation between farm operating acreage and CRP participation; but is consistent with the positive 
relationship found by McLean, Hui, and Joseph (1994) based on a survey of 113 farmers in Louisiana.    
  15likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. Farmers might well expect to have higher 
bids accepted in areas where the EBI scores are high.  
Participation in CRP rises as the proportion of land in the surrounding county is 
classified as high quality, but not as low quality. This might suggests that CRP 
participation may be higher in areas where land is well suited for agriculture, but, 
unfortunately, unless one had information about land quality by farm, it is impossible to 
tell anything about the quality of land that is enrolled in CRP, or how the land quality on 
the farm affects a farmer’s decision to participate. Our results are consistent with county-
level analyses reporting negative relationships between a soil erosion index and CRP 
participation (Goodwin, et al., 2004; Kazim and Osborn, 1990).   
It is also true that the likelihood of CRP participation falls if the farm is enrolled 
in a voluntary agricultural district, is subject to a farmland preservation easement, or is 
located in an agricultural protection zone or zoned exclusively for agricultural use. 
Farmers participating in these farmland retention programs are concerned with the 
economic viability of farming, especially in rapidly growing areas where there is serious 
competition for land for non-agricultural purposes. The fact that CRP participation falls 
with an increase in proportion of urban population reinforces the results.
10
Based on our comparative static results, it is no surprise that the receipt of 
decoupled payments decreases the likelihood of participation in CRP. These payments 
are not tied to production of a specific crop, but farmers receiving them are required to 
maintain a certain amount of land in production. Furthermore, when compared to CRP 
payments, decoupled payments provide an alternative source of income stability that 
could offset the greater price and production yield risk from leaving more land in 
                                                 
10 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urbanized areas.   
  16agricultural production.
11 Since CRP payments are less variable than are returns to 
farming, there is additional support for these conclusions by the fact that the probability 
of CRP participation falls as preference for risk increases. 
In previous literature, the empirical evidence of the effects of human capital and 
stage in the life cycle (age, experience, and education) on CRP participation is mixed.
12 
Based on our analysis, the likelihood of CRP participation increases both with the age 
and the level of education of the farm operator. In terms of the life cycle, older farmers 
may commit some land to CRP as a way of reducing operator labor requirements or 
holding onto farmland assets until they are needed for retirement, or they can be passed 
on through an estate. The fact that farm operators working off the farm are more likely to 
participate in CRP may reflect a desire on the part of those working off the farm to 
reduce farm labor requirements. A similar result is found in the case of a spouse working 
off the farm, although this effect is not statistically significant.  
Econometric Tests Related to the Probit Choice Model 
We test to see whether or not binary choices other than participation in CRP are 
exogenous to reinforce the validity of policy conclusions involving these variables. The 
assumption of normality of the probit model is also tested.  
Tests for Exogenous Decisions  
The variables for which this is a concern are: off-farm work by the operator or 
spouse, participation in EQIP, participation in agricultural districts, etc. and the receipt of 
                                                 
11 These finding are also consistent with those reported in other studies examining the effect of government 
payment on CRP participation (Isik and Yang, 2004). However, participating in other environmental 
programs (EQIP) of the farm household increases the likelihood of CRP participation although it is not 
statistically significant. Participation in both EQIP and CRP could reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the 
environment by removing particularly venerable land from production, while using more environmentally 
friendly practices on land still in production.   
12 Kazim and Osborn (1994) and Kalaitzandonakes and Monson (1994) found a negative relationship 
between age and the CRP participation, but McLean, Hui, and Joseph (1994) found the reverse.   
  17decoupled payments. We test the null hypothesis that binary decisions associated with the 
four discrete binary variables are exogenous to CRP participation using a method by 
Vella (1993). For decoupled payments, the test follows Smith and Blundell (1986).  
These tests involve several steps. For each discrete variable, we specify a separate 
participation equation including the variables from both the original CRP participation 
equation and new variables that are believed to determine the variable being tested.
13 For 
each test, we estimate a two-equation simultaneous probit model (Vella, 1993)
14 that that 
includes the original CRP equation and the new equation for the variable being tested. 
We calculate the general inverse mills ratios for the new participation equation and re-
estimate the original binary CRP equation with the general inverse mills ratios as an 
explanatory variable. We fail to reject the hypothesis that these binary choices are 
exogenous if the t-ratios on the coefficients associated with the general inverse mills 
ratios is statistically insignificant.
15  Once the new equation is specified for decoupled 
payments,
16 we follow the two-stage method by Smith and Blundell (1986) to test the 
null hypothesis that decoupled payment are exogenous. Predicted residuals are added to 
the original choice model; if the coefficient on this variable is statistically insignificant, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
                                                 
13 The specification of these extra variables is based on the goodness of fit from several possible trials.  
14 Empirically, the additional variables used in testing the operator’s decision to work off the farm are: if 
the operator is raised on the farm and indices relating to the local economic importance of manufacturing, 
services, agriculture, and trade. The additional variables in testing the spouse’s decision to work off the 
farm include several human capital variables, the family characteristics and the local economic indices by 
sector. The age of the operator and farming experience represent human capital, and the number of the 
household members and the numbers of children represent the family characteristics. We add nothing for 
testing if the decisions to participate in EQIP and agricultural districts are endogenous to CRP choice, since 
these three programs are all related to environmental considerations. As such, the factors determining these 
three decisions are likely the same. 
15 We adjust standard errors based on asymptotic theory proposed by Murphy and Topel (1985). 
16 The additional variables in testing the decision to receive decoupled payments decision are the local 
economic indices for manufacturing, agriculture, services, and trade. 
  18Except for the decision to participate in EQIP, we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
the corresponding decision is exogenous to the CRP participation decision (Table 3). The 
test for EQIP may not be valid; the model prediction for the EQIP equation is only 2.6%.  
Tests for Normality        
We test the normality assumption of the error using a general non-parametric test 
by comparing predicted probabilities between the probit model and a non-parametric 
regression (Horowitz, 1993). The quadratic density is selected as the kernel density, with 
bandwidth of 0.15.
17 By inspection of Figure 1, the probit model performs similarly to the 
non-parametric alternative, particularly for probabilities less than 0.50. The two 
predictions are less consistent for probabilities greater than 0.5, but they still lie within 
the non-parametric confidence band. Normality is not rejected.          
CRP Payment and Acreage Equations 
  In developing a complete understanding of factors affecting CRP enrollment, we 
must also estimate an equation for the number of acres enrolled for the CRP participants. 
Since it is expected that the level of payment may well influence land enrolled, we 
estimate a CRP payment equation as well. The inverse mills ratio is included in both 
equations to control for any sample selection bias, and it is statistically significant in both. 
Consistent with a tradition in labor economics, the performance of the payment equation 
was improved through a semi-logarithmic specification.  
On balance, the factors that affect the size of CRP payments make sense (Table 4). 
CRP payments are directly related to the proportion of cropland in the area that is of high 
quality, and they differ by region. All else equal, they tend to be higher in the Heartland, 
but lower in the Eastern Uplands, the Southern Seaboard, and the Fruitful Rim than in the 
                                                 
17 The same conclusions are evident for different choices in bandwidth. 
  19rest of the regions.
18 Payments increase with the percentage of local employment in 
manufacturing which is likely related to the strength of the regional economy.  
The CRP payment also decreases as the proportion of land on the farm that is 
planted to cash grain increases. The fact that payments are lower for farms classified as 
cash grain could well reflect the fact that these farm operators may tend to enroll 
somewhat poorer quality land in CRP, particularly in situations where the most 
productive land is retained in crop production.  
The effect of human capital on payment is represented by years of farming 
experience and its squared term. The farmer with more farming experience is likely to 
receive higher payments, but the payment increases at a decreasing rate. This experience 
may contribute to effectiveness at bidding and selecting appropriate land and 
management practice for CRP land.  
To control for endogenously, we use the predicted per acre payment as the 
instrument in the acreage equation. From a policy standpoint, the factors that affect the 
acreage enrolled in CRP are quite interesting (Table 5). An immediate noteworthy result 
is that the number of acres enrolled in CRP increases as the CRP payment per acre 
increases. However, the negative coefficient on an interaction term for payment and low 
land quality (PLQL) indicates that this effect decreases in size in areas with higher 
proportions of low quality land. 
One would certainly expect acreage enrolled to respond to this direct payment 
incentive.
19 It is perhaps one of the most significant findings in our analysis because it is 
                                                 
18 While these results would seem reasonable, it would be helpful to know how these differences square 
with differences in agricultural land prices or rental rates across these regions. If this were true, there would 
be evidence that CRP payments differ relative to the opportunity cost of land in production by region. 
  20inconsistent with much of the previous literature, particularly studies based on county-
level analysis, where the acres enrolled fall as payments rise.
20 The fact that the positive 
price effect decreases in areas with high proportions of low quality land is consistent with 
the belief held by some that the maximum payment is often set too high in areas 
attempting to enroll higher quality land. It is also consistent with a belief that some 
farmers trying to enroll poorer quality land bid relatively low to ensure acceptance. 
Acreage in CRP is lower in the Heartland and Mississippi Portal, but higher in the 
Northern Great Plains, Eastern Uplands, the Southern Seaboard, and the Fruitful Rim. 
These results reinforce the fact that acres enrolled for CRP participants decline as the 
proportion of land that is of high quality in a locality increases. This is somewhat at odds 
with the results from the CRP participation equation (Table 2), where the likelihood of 
participation in CRP is increased as the proportion of land that is of high quality in a 
locality increases. Our result might be interpreted as a problem in adverse selection: 
farmers may be unlikely to enroll high or medium quality land into CRP; they retain it in 
crop production. It is difficult to know if this finding is consistent with one of the primary 
goals of CRP, the reduction of soil erosion and other environmental residuals. There is 
consistency only if poorer quality land is more subject to erosion and environmentally 
venerable.   
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Suter (2004) found that annual incentive payments affect CREP enrollment in buffer strips, measured as 
a proportion of eligible farmland. His study is based on data aggregated at the county level, but the positive 
relationship between land enrolled and level of payment was only apparent when he used a refined estimate 
of eligible farmland derived from GIS data on the amount of agricultural land along streams in the target 
watersheds. 
20 For example, both Fleming (2004) and Goodwin et al. (2004), who study the CRP acreage response 
based on the county-level data, found a negative relationship between CRP acreage enrollment and the 
annual payment. This would make sense only if farmers try to lower their bids in order to increase the 
chance of their bids being accepted.   
  21In the participation equation above, we developed an argument for why farmers 
receiving higher decoupled payments are less likely to participate in CRP. A similar 
rationale would explain why the acreage in CRP for those participants with higher 
decoupled payments would enroll fewer acres. CRP acreage is also determined by local 
economic indices. Local areas with a higher proportion employed in manufacturing have 
less land enrolled in CRP, which might reflect the opportunity cost of land in non-
agricultural uses and work against large acreages being committed to programs such as 
CRP. We also see that farmers participating in EQIP are likely to decrease the acreage 
enrolled of CRP. This result might seem at odds with our finding from the CRP 
participation equation above. Since both EQIP and CRP are environmental friendly 
programs, these results could reflect competition for land in programs that contribute in 
different ways to a farmer’s stewardship of the land.     
There are also characteristics of the farming operation and household that affect 
the acreage enrollment. Acreage increases with farm and family size, and for those farms 
classified as cash grain farms, although the effect of the latter is not statistically 
significant in the acreage equation. Acreage decreases with the farming experience of the 
operator, but increases with the farm operator’s education; this reinforces the effect from 
the participation equation, but the effect of education is not statistically significant. As in 
the participation equation, CRP acreage increases with the aversion to risk.  
Production Efficiency and CRP Participation 
To identify the effects of CRP participation on farm productivity, we first specify 
variable returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production functions for CRP participants and for 
non-participants. Gross cash sales, including crop and livestock sales, are used as the 
  22measure of production.
 21  Total acres operated is the land input. We aggregate the 
expenditures for fertilizer, seeds, plants, fuel, and utilities as a measure of production cost. 
The hired labor cost includes regular hired and contact labor. Capital is measured by the 
fixed value of farm machinery and equipment, breeding stock, and farm buildings.  
Although the production functions for both groups exhibit increasing return to scale 
(Table 6), farmers participating in CRP enjoy the higher returns to scale (1.26 vs. 1.063). 
The production elasticities for the inputs differ between groups as well.  
After decomposing the two error components, we see from Table 7 that the 
average technical efficiency is slightly lower for the CRP participants (0.354 vs. 0.368). 
Although not shown in the table, the estimates of technical efficiency for CRP 
participants are also more disperse than those for the non-CRP participants.  
Based on the generalized Malmquist TFP Index, the TFP of participants is slightly 
below that of the non-participant group (ratio of 0.938), at the means of the data (Table 7). 
This is partially explained by the fact that CRP participants are less technically efficient 
(ratio of 0.962), and they are on a lower production frontier (ratio of 0.765). CRP 
participants generally have larger farms; our results suggest that they can indeed exploit 
greater returns to scale. Without this opportunity, as measured by the ratio of scale 
efficiency, 1.276, the TFP of CRP farms would probably be even lower.  
Concluding Remarks 
Using the 2001 ARMS data, we estimate a binary probit model for CRP 
participation and test for exogeneity of some other policy choice variables and normality. 
We estimate both a CRP per-acre payment equation and a CRP acreage enrollment 
                                                 
21 The output variable used here is the same as used by Goodwin and Mishara (2004) to study the efficiency 
of farm households working off the farm. 
  23equation, correcting for sample selection bias. In the third stage, we estimate differences 
in technical and scale efficiency and factor productivity between CRP participants and 
non-participants. Statistical tests confirm the need to control for sample selection, and 
support the hypothesis that off-farm work decisions and participation in other farm 
programs are not determined endogenously with CRP participation.  
We find that the farms with smaller payments from other farm programs are more 
likely to participate in CRP, as are farmers that work off the farm and are in areas where 
land quality is relatively high. In contrast, although farmers in areas where soil quality is 
high are more likely to participate in CRP, the level of participation (as measured by 
acreage enrolled) is higher in areas where land quality is relatively low. Since the 
coefficient on the predicted per-acre payments is positive and statistically significant in 
this acreage equation, the level of participation does increase with the payment level. 
Farmers’ risk attitudes affect participation. More risk-averse farmers are more likely to 
participate in CRP, and they also tend to enroll more acres. We also find that farmers 
attempting to protect the future viability of their farming operations by participating in 
state or local agricultural district programs, are located in an agricultural protection zone, 
etc. are less likely remove cropland from agricultural production by participating in CRP. 
Finally, CRP farms are somewhat larger than non-participants, and they are able to 
exploit larger economies of scale. Despite this fact, they are both slightly less technically 
efficient, and they have a slightly lower production frontier. 
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  27Table 1: Summary Statistics for the full sample of Farms in the ARMS Data, 2001
Variable 
 Names Variable Definitions Mean  Std.
OP Operator works off farm (=1) 0.56 0.50
SP Spouse is work off farm (=1) 0.53 0.50
CRP_CREP Household in CRP or CREP (=1) 0.23 0.42
EQIP Participate in EQIP (=1) 0.0029 0.0539
URBAN % labor market area’s population in urban areas 56.06 22.17
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.84 6.90
LQH_96 Index of high quality land, 1996 0.33 0.25
LQM_96 Index of medium quality land,1996 0.29 0.15
LQL_96 Index of low quality land, 1996 0.23 0.19
AGDIST Ooperator participates in local agricultural preservation program (=1) 0.05 0.22
REGN1 ERS region 1(Heartland) (=1) 0.28 0.45
REGN3 ERS region 3 (Northern Great Plains) (=1) 0.08 0.27
REGN567 ERS region 5 (Eastern Uplands), 6 (Southern Seaboard), 7 (Fruitful Rim) (=1) 0.29 0.45
REGN9 ERS region 9 (Mississippi Portal) (=1) 0.05 0.22
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.74 1.26
OP_ED_C Education level of the operator (years) 13.08 2.45
OP_EDSQ Square terms of education level of the operator (year) 177.04 65.48
CROP17 Cash grain farm, (=1) 0.71 0.46
CROP456 Vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1) 0.21 0.41
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA payment 5.42 12.57
LDP_A Per acre LDP payment 8.25 18.63
OP_AGE Age of the operator 54.57 13.71
LP_CRP_C Logarithm of the per acre CRP payment 3.99 0.71
OP_EXP Years operator worked on farm job 25.50 63.00
OP_EXPSQ Square of years that the operator worked on farm 4618 123835
RISK Risk preference of operator; =0 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.43 2.46
RAISE_OP Operator raised on the farm (=1) 0.78 0.41
CROPSIZ1 Operaed acreage divided by 1,000 0.32 0.68
A_CRP_C Acre enrollment in CRP or CREP 140.78 293.23
EBI Environmental benefit index 61.67 3.85
LGOUT Logarithm of the crop and livestock sales divided by 1,000 2.63 2.05
LGLC_C Logarithm of the livestock, crop, energy expenses 9.29 1.95
LGLAND Logarithm of operated acreage 4.70 1.87
LGCA Logarithm value of mach.and equip. breeding stock, building ($1,000)   5.43 1.35
LGLABOR Logarithm of hired labor cost 5.43 3.91
* Note: all variables are weighted by the full sampl weights
  28Table 2: CRP Participation Equation (Probit Model)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coef./St.Err.
Constant -5.4548 1.4610 -3.7335
OP_AGE 0.0333 0.0036 9.3062
OP_ED_C 0.0731 0.0151 4.8455
LQH_96 0.5025 0.2127 2.3619
LQL_96 -1.1808 0.3188 -3.7033
EQIP 1.1404 0.6637 1.7181
AGDIST -1.1552 0.2767 -4.1754
EBI 0.0499 0.0220 2.2696
AMTA_A -0.0301 0.0047 -6.3696
LDP_A -0.0137 0.0028 -4.9278
RISK -0.0661 0.0168 -3.9395
CROP456 -1.8804 0.2894 -6.4980
CROPSIZ1 0.2791 0.0516 5.4145
REGN1 0.1325 0.1009 1.3122
REGN567 -0.3654 0.1455 -2.5118
REGN9 1.2075 0.2548 4.7393
URBAN -0.0145 0.0017 -8.3349
SP 0.1043 0.0806 1.2943








Table 3: Tests for Exogenous Variables in CRP Participation Equation






* Standard error is adjusted by Murphy and Topel's method.
Binary Exogenous Variable*
Continous Exogenous Variable
  29Table 4: CRP Payment Equation
Variable Coef. St. Error b/St.Err.
Constant 2.803 0.775 3.616
OP_EXP 0.040 0.006 6.963
OP_EXPSQ -0.001 0.000 -7.054
LQH_96 0.796 0.156 5.107
LQM_96 0.954 0.229 4.161
EBI 0.001 0.012 0.049
CROPSIZ1 -0.020 0.031 -0.626
H_SIZE -0.045 0.025 -1.800
REGN1 0.551 0.072 7.694
REGN567 -0.495 0.129 -3.846
CROP17 -0.327 0.171 -1.916
MANUF 0.014 0.004 3.299
IMR 0.193 0.066 2.929
 
 
Table 5: CRP Acreage Equation
Variable  Coef. St. Error b/St.Er.
Constant 632.99 288.84 2.19
OP_EXP -20.81 5.77 -3.61
OP_EXPSQ 0.36 0.09 3.82
OP_ED_C 8.95 42.53 0.21
OP_EDSQ -0.59 1.57 -0.38
RISK -4.65 5.86 -0.79
LQH_96 -818.42 116.15 -7.05
LQM_96 -749.06 139.73 -5.36
REGN1 -227.22 90.36 -2.51
REGN3 70.03 42.95 1.63
REGN567 74.64 62.62 1.19
REGN9 -108.12 64.24 -1.68
CROPSIZ1 134.98 15.78 8.56
AMTA_A -3.69 2.38 -1.55
H_SIZE 17.97 12.30 1.46
MANUF -4.71 3.19 -1.48
SERV 2.48 3.19 0.78
EQIP -442.07 155.71 -2.84
PLQL -7.53 3.37 -2.24
P_HAT 7.95 2.51 3.17
IMR -76.45 44.68 -1.71
 
  30Table 6:  Traditional Production Functions
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er.
Constant -6.009 0.537 -11.191
LGLAND 0.462 0.091 5.074
LGLC_C 0.308 0.093 3.297
LGLABOR 0.092 0.019 4.894
LGCA 0.398 0.085 4.683







Constant -4.765 0.270 -17.631
LGLAND 0.259 0.034 7.597
LGLC_C 0.493 0.049 10.005
LGLABOR 0.113 0.009 12.413
LGCA 0.198 0.033 5.958












Technical Efficiency, CRP participants (VRS) 0.354
Technical Efficiency,non-participants (VRS) 0.368
Technical Efficiency Index Ratio 0.962
Production Frontier Index Ratio 0.765
Economic Scale Index Ratio 1.276
Total Factor Productivity Ratio 0.939
* Note: Ratios are calculated based on non-participant group.
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Figure 1: Nonparametric Test for Normality 
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